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INTRODUCTION
Self-induced propulsion into the Space Age has prompted
man's use of outer space for the purpose of surveying and examining
the Earth. Commonly referred to as "remote sensing of the Earth
from space,"' this capability provides a challenge far beyond its
current scientific and technological aspects. Such activities may
appear to be worth little more than passing notice to the unin-
formed. Concerned parties, on the other hand, are well aware of the
fantastic practical applications to which this capability can be ap-
plied.
Likely locations for undiscovered oil or mineral deposits, ex-
pected crop yields, sources of pollution, the manner and direction
in which cities are expanding, and possibly militarily significant
data are among the types of information which may be acquired by
the use of remote sensing satellites. However, the unqualified use
of, or access to, remote sensing capabilities can be detrimental if
placed at the disposal of irresponsible parties, despite the definite
derivation of potential benefits. Therefore, in light of nationalistic
and global interests, remote sensing has been an extensively de-
bated subject. No comprehensive solution has yet emerged regard-
1. The following are used by the United Nations:
Remote sensing of the earth from space is a methodology to assist in character-
izing the nature and condition of the natural resources, natural features and phe-
nomena, and the environment of the earth by means of observations and measure-
ments from space platforms.
A remote sensing system comprises all those elements described in . . . [the
definition abovej and consists of a space segment and a ground segment. The
former comprises a platform from which the earth can be observed, sensors of
whatever variety to make these observations and take measurements, some means
of transferring these data to the earth. The latter comprises at least one ground
terminal for reception of such data, data processing and data interpretation facility
or facilities.
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Report of the Scientific and Technical Sub-
Committee, U.N. Doc. A/AC.10/118, at 12 (1973).
For purposes of this Comment, reference to "remote sensing of the Earth from space,"
is not intended to include data gathered by satellites or other systems which are developed
primarily for military or national defense purposes.
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ing the many implications to which the area so easily lends itself.
In its most simplistic form, remote sensing of the Earth (herein-
after referred to as "remote sensing") involves the use of satellites
to obtain new perspectives on the qualities of the ground below.2
Assuming only one's own property is examined from such a vantage
point, others have no basis for complaint. When, however, adjoining
property is perused, this activity may cross boundaries of propriety.
A brief consideration of the potential legal problems arising from
such a situation will yield an overview of various issues surrounding
the advent of the remote sensing satellite. Such issues may be sum-
marized as: the propriety of conducting remote sensing activities;
the proper use of the acquired knowledge; and the obligation to
inform others of either the investigation or the information derived
therefrom.
This Comment will attempt to develop the background and
status of remote sensing, in seeking to effectuate a goal of ensuring
the greatest number of constructive uses while minimizing potential
abuses. It will examine and critique the appropriateness of attempt-
ing to develop a viable solution through the application of legal
regimes. Further, it will consider global policies and actions which
have acted in concert to create the present situation. Finally, it will
suggest an appropriate role for legal energies in the search for possi-
ble solutions to this Space Age dilemma.
I. MECHAMCS OF REwM SENSm
A prerequisite to an evaluation of either existing or potential
legal propositions is a review of the general characteristics of an
actual remote sensing system. As one commentator has noted: "Any
difficulties likely to be encountered in formulating future space law
will be caused by failure to become familiar with the scientific and
technological space application for which the law is proposed."
'3
Although the United States, the Soviet Union, India, the European
Space Agency (ESA), and the German Democratic Republic are
currently operating or developing remote sensing programs,' the
2.'rhe final goal of remote sensing is-in a certain respect-to bring out some informa-
tion about the status of a place to which one has no immediate access," as noted by Stoebner,
Remote Sensing of Earth Resources: Technique and Law, in LGAL IMPUCATMONS OF REMOTE
SENSm FRoM OTum SPACE 33, 33 (N. Matte & H. DeSaussure eds. 1976).
3. Galloway, Introduction to the Symposium on International Organizations and the
Law of Outer Space, 5 J. SPACE L. 3, 5 (1977).
4. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Report of the Scientific and Legal
Sub-Committee, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/195, at 12 (1977).
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program most widely used is the United States' LANDSAT sys-
tern.1 This leadership position renders the LANDSAT system repre-
sentative of the capabilities and potential benefits of remote sensing
programs.
LANDSAT satellites,' placed in polar orbits, circle the Earth
every 103 minutes, or fourteen times a day.7 Such orbits enable
these satellites to scan "any point on Earth except for small areas
around the poles."' Scanning is performed by two main sensing
devices: a Multispectral Scanner, which uses reflected or emitted
electromagnetic wavelengths to acquire data; and a Return Beam
Vidicon (television) camera system.' LANDSAT satellites are also
equipped to work in conjunction with unattended ground-based sen-
sors to receive and relay additional information. I" All data acquired
Currently only the United States and the Soviet systems are functional; however, the
ESA-Space Lab program is scheduled for 1980. More recently, France has decided to establish
its own remote sensing system known as SPOT (Satellite Probatoire d'Observation de la
Terre). Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Report of the Scientific and Techni-
cal Sub-Committee, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/216, at 9, 11 (1978) [hereinafter cited as U.N. Doc.
A/AC.105/2161.
5. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, supra note 4, at 12.
6. LANDSAT, initially the Earth Resources Technology Satellite (ERTS-1), was
launched in 1972 and renamed LANDSAT-1 in 1974. This satellite was in operation until shut
down in January of 1978. The ERTS-B satellite, renamed LANDSAT-2 after its launch in
1975, is still operational. A third satellite, LANDSAT-3, was launched in March 1978, and a
fourth LANDSAT has been proposed for launch in the 1980s. See U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/216,
supra note 4, at 9; Satellite Launched to Eye Earth Resources, L.A. Times, Mar. 6, 1978, § 2
(Metro), at 1, col. 5. See generally Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, supra
note 4, at 12.
7. Doyle, Remote Sensing By Satellite: Technical and Operational Implications for In-
ternational Cooperation, in LEOAL IMPLCATIONS OF REMOTE SENSING FROM OtrrR SPAcE 3, 6
(N. Matte & H. DeSaussure eds. 1976).
8. Id. Mr. Doyle points out that the combination of these polar orbits and the frequency
with which the satellites circumnavigate the Earth enable each satellite to view, at 18 day
intervals, the same spot anywhere in the world at the same time of day (i.e., with the same
angle of sunlight). Id. Working in conjunction, these satellites can, therefore, examine any
area even more frequently. LANDSATs -2 and -3 together complete a total Earth survey every
nine days.
9. Id. at 6-7. LANDSATs -1 and -2 produced images of the Earth's surface "185 x 185
kin. (about 115 x 115 statute miles) square, with a resolution of about 80 meters (250 feet)."
Id.
LANDSAT-3 is almost identical to its predecessors, except it has an additional infra-
red range in its Multispectral Scanner. This enables it to detect thermal radiation given off
by objects in either daylight or darkness. Earlier LANDSATs were unable to gather such data
except under daylight conditions. Additionally, LANDSAT-3 has a fier spatial resolution
of approximately 40 meters (130 feet) on its Return Beam Vidicon camera. The proposed
LANDSAT-4 would have an even greater data acquisition capacity of 30 meters (100 feet).
U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/216, supra note 4, at 9.
10. Doyle, supra note 7, at 7. It has been noted that there may be as many as a
thousand remote sensors on the ground that radio information to the LANDSAT satellites.
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by the satellites is then transmitted to ground-based receiving sta-
tions."
Each ground station is able to obtain data directly from the
satellite concerning an area roughly 3000 kilometers (3,700 miles) in
diameter." Additionally, tape recorders onboard the satellites per-
mit data to be gathered out of ground station range and transmitted
to Earth at an appropriate time. 3 Once received by a ground sta-
tion, data obtained through remote sensing methods is processed
and analyzed" in order to obtain information.
Although LANDSAT is not a comprehensive development of
the ultimate capabilities of remote sensing systems, it is evident
from the foregoing that remote sensing permits the examination and
consideration of relatively large areas. Moreover, present technology
does not allow data to be gathered selectively along geographical or
Satellite Launched to Eye Earth Resources, supra note 6, at 1, col. 5.
When functioning concurrently these methods of LANDSAT sensing obtain "information
relating to crop species, crop health, geologic structure and rock types, [sloil types, moisture
content of the ground, coastal processes, surface water distribution,. . . water pollution,"
water levels, snow depth, surface temperature, ocean salinity, ice pressure, ocean currents
and atmospheric pollution. Doyle, supra note 7, at 7; Satellite Launched to Eye Earth Re-
sources, supra note 6, at 1, col. 5.
11. Within the United States there are LANDSAT receiving stations at Fairbanks,
Alaska; Goldstone, California; and Greenbelt, Maryland. Also located in Greenbelt, Mary-
land, is the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center which houses the Operations Control Center
and the Data Processing Facility.
LANDSAT data is transmitted to the Earth Resources Observation Systems (EROS)
Data Center, which is operated by the United States Interior Department at Sioux Falls,
South Dakota. Once on file at the EROS Data Center copies of this data may be purchased
by anyone. See notes 85-107 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the United States
policy of open dissemination.
Foreign LANDSAT receiving stations are currently operating in Brazil, Canada and
Italy, while additional stations are planned for Argentina, Chile, Indonesia, Iran, Japan,
Sweden, Upper Volta and Zaire. These foreign LANDSAT ground stations are established
pursuant to signed agreements with NASA. However, they are foreign owned and operated,
and have their own processing and data dissemination facilities. See, e.g., Agreement on
Remote Sensing From Satellites and Aircraft, Mar. 19-22, 1976, United States-Canada, 27
U.S.T. 1075, T.I.A.S. No. 8247; Memorandum of Understanding on Remote Sensing, Jan. 6-
31, 1975, United States-Zaire, 26 U.S.T. 1699, T.I.A.S. No. 8129.
12. Leigh, United States Policy of Collecting and Disseminating Remote Sensing Data,
in LEGAL IMPLICA'TIONS OF REMOTE SENsINo FROM Ourmi SPACE 147, 149 (N. Matte & H.
DeSaussure eds. 1976).
13. Id.
14. A large part of this data analysis is a comparison of the data acquired by the space
segment with "ground truth." "Ground truth" is the result of spectral or other examinations
conducted on Earth which then establish the individual characters of known substances.
These known results can then be compared to data from the space segment in order to
interpret what information regarding the Earth has thereby been made available.
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political boundaries. 5 The combined result may be that existing
technological restrictions actually promote beneficial uses of remote
sensing systems; however, they also tend to promote the potential
for international tension.
I. ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS
Although free to negotiate multilateral or bilateral treaties, na-
tions have often deliberated issues of remote sensing within, or with
reference to, the United Nations. The United Nations has provided
a forum both for encouraging exchanges of scientific and technologi-
cal information, and for debates regarding the urgency of elaborat-
ing legal principles to govern remote sensing activities."
The debates dealing with the legal implications of remote sen-
sing from space have focused upon alternative means of regulation.II
The legal arguments that advocate regulation of remote sensing
activities generally appear to justify the view that restrictions are
necessary to maintain desired control. This presupposes both that
remote sensing from space actually threatens this control, and that
regulations will lessen or negate this danger. Therefore, any interna-
tional regulatory system, to be beneficial, must focus upon these
perceptions in attempting to decrease the potential for harm.
The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space (COPUOS)" and its two subcommittees, the Scientific and
15. Statement by Ronald F. Stowe during a meeting of the Legal Sub-Committee of the
United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (Feb. 19, 1975), reprinted
in 72 DEP'T STATE BULL. 419, 421 (1975).
16. To expect the United Nations to continue to operate indefinitely within this role is
unrealistic. Eventually, the process of remote sensing from satellites will require some en-
forceable definitions of rights and responsibilities. If these obligations are promulgated as part
of the United Nations function, it should be expected that the United Nations will take an
active role in their continuing existence. Conversely, if delineation of remote sensing obliga-
tions takes place through the enactment of multilateral or bilateral treaties, then the United
Nations can be expected to have a lessened, even negligible, impact on further remote sensing
deliberations.
17. See notes 51-67 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the right to conduct
remote sensing activities; and see notes 68-147 infra and accompanying text for a discussion
on the national policies on dissemination.
18. COPUOS was established as a committee in 1959. G.A. Res. 1472, 14 U.N. GAOR
(856th plen. mtg.), Supp. (No. 16) 5, U.N. Doc. A/PV.856 (1959). It was made a permanent
body of the United Nations in 1961. G.A. Res. 1721, 16(1) U.N. GAOR (1085th plen. mtg.),
Supp. (No. 17) 7, U.N. Doc. A/PV.1085 (1961).
For a brief development on the membership and operation of this committee, see Jan-
kowitsch, Contributions of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space: An Overview, 5 J. SPAcE L. 7, 7-8 (1977).
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Technical Sub-Committee"9 and the Legal Sub-Committee, 20 are
particularly involved with these issues. These bodies are concerned
with potential peaceful uses of outer space, and are therefore at-
tempting to promulgate international guidelines for such uses. Dis-
cussions continue concurrently within COPUOS and its subcom-
mittees, with the Scientific and Technical Sub-Committee concen-
trating on organizational and technical aspects,2' while the Legal
Sub-Committee concentrates on legal implications.2 Each subcom-
mittee then considers the other's work in an attempt to formulate
final solutions. One facet of their involvement is the development
of a viable solution for problems surrounding the operation of re-
mote sensing systems. To facilitate this purpose, the Legal Sub-
Committee has created a Working Group HI to deal specifically with
the legal implications of remote sensing of the Earth from space.
Working Group 11, along with both subcommittees and COPUOS,
has considered proposals of member nations in an attempt to delin-
eate areas of consensus.Y
Working Group I of the Legal Sub-Committee has promul-
gated draft principles from the proposals before COPUOS and var-
ious national policies.2 These draft principles reflect the areas of
19. Id. at 8.
20. Id.
21. Functions of the Scientific and Technical Sub-Committee include "the exchange of
information about international cooperation in outer space matters, the provision of advice
to the Main Committee on scientific, technical and organizational questions and the promo-
tion of international cooperation in outer space matters with particular reference to space
applications programs which might benefit developing countries." Carver, The Scientific and
Technical Sub-Committee On the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 5 J. SPACE L. 17, 17 (1977).
22. The purpose of the Legal Sub-Committee is "to study legal problems which may
arise from the exploration and use of outer space." Jankowitsch, supra note 18, at 8.
23. The term "consensus" in this United Nations context is generally understood to refer
to unanimous consent regarding the substance of a proposal. Less than unanimous consent
could result in an "agreement," but not a "consensus." See generally Jankowitsch, supra note
18.
24. Since 1975, three draft international agreements, presented to COPUOS, have
formed the foundation for United Nations deliberations. These include a joint Soviet-French
working paper, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.99 (1975); a United States working paper, U.N.
Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.103 (1975); and a draft treaty proposal by Argentina and Brazil, co-
sponsored by Chile, Mexico and Venezuela. Treaty on Remote Sensing of Natural Resources
by Means of Space Technology, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/1047 (1974). See generally Polter, Remote
Sensing and State Sovereignty, 4 J. SPACE L. 99 (1976) for an analysis of these proposals vis-
a-vis each other, as well as a discussion of their relative support in international law.
As noted by Polter, supra, these proposals differ in their approaches to restricting remote
sensing programs. The original Argentine-Brazilian (Latin American) proposal would require
the consent of the sensed state before remote sensing of its territory could be conducted, as
well as requiring the consent of the sensed state before any information acquired by remote
sensing could be disseminated to third parties.
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consenus." Within this framework are general provisions detailing
proper uses of remote sensing," sharing of technical assistance,2 and
some rudimentary legal propositions.2 Although there has not been
agreement on the exact language, the intent of the proposed princi-
ples can briefly be described as:
(1) The use of remote sensing for the benefit and in the interests
of all countries;
(2) Conduct of remote sensing to be done in accordance with
international law, including the United Nations Charter and the
1967 Outer Space Treaty;"
(3) Carrying-out of remote sensing programs so as to promote
international cooperation, with an emphasis on shared regional
facilities to maximize benefits;
(4) Use of remote sensing to promote protection of the natural
environment of the Earth;
(5) Provision of technical assistance from sensing states to other
interested states;
(6) A United Nations role in the promotion of international coop-
eration, including technical assistance;
(7) The prompt dissemination of any remote sensing information
indicating impending natural disasters to states likely to be af-
fected;
(8) Uses of remote sensing consistent with the legitimate rights
and interests of other states;
(9) An availability through the United Nations of any relevant
technical information which sensing states are free to disclose;
The Franco-Soviet paper would not restrict the right of nations to conduct remote sensing
activities. However, it would extend the principle of state sovereignty to include a nation's
right to control the disposal of information regarding its resources.
The United States working paper proposes that remote sensing data be available to all
interested parties "on an equitable, timely, and nondiscriminatory basis." United States
working paper, supra, at 105.
25. See note 23 supra for the United Nations definition of the term "consensus." Much
of the disagreement over the final language to be adopted by these principles involves discus-
sion of whether these principles "should" or "shall" be followed by all nations, and whether
these principles are to be applicable to remote sensing of "natural resources" or the "Earth
environment." See Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Report of the Legal Sub-
Committee (16th mtg.), Annex El (App. A), U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/196, at 4 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Annex MI].
26. Id. draft principles I, E[, IV, V and VII.
27. Id. draft principles V, VI and IX.
28. Id. draft principles H, VII, X and XI.
29. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, Jan. 27, 1964, United States-United Kingdom-Soviet Union, 18 U.S.T. 2410,
T.I.A.S. No. 6347 [hereinafter cited as the 1967 Outer Space Treaty].
1979]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Ann.
(10) International responsibility of states for remote sensing ac-
tivities carried out by government entities; and
(11) Access by a sensed state to data pertaining to its territory.n
Despite the progress made in establishing these draft princi-
ples, major unresolved issues could easily minimize their value.
Since these proposed principles are vague, further interpretation is
required. 3' Much of the indefiniteness inherent in these draft princi-
ples can be attributed to the unanimity of agreement requirements
of the United Nations "consensus" process. The difficulty is further
compounded in the area of remote sensing by the practice of the
COPUOS subcommittees constantly considering the other's work
while proceeding with their own advances. Although the ideal of
progressing in this fashion may be laudatory, in actuality, the re-
spective goals of science and technology compared to relevant legal
aspirations may be contradictory.
IlI. INTERNATIONAL CONSmERATIONS: THE PoLmcs OF REMOTE
SENSING
The initial controversy in remote sensing arises when the satel-
lite commences to collect data.32 Additional complications may re-
sult after data is received by the ground station. Among these com-
plications are issues surrounding the dissemination of raw data or
analyzed information to sensed states and third parties.u Further-
more, application, rather than dissemination of data or information,
may create future difficulties.Y Finally, any improper combination
of the foregoing may result in abuses of the remote sensing process.
Although deliberations concerning remote sensing have failed to
reach any universally acceptable solutions, these discussions have
30. Annex I, supra note 25, at 4.
31. Part of this interpretation process will be accomplished by decisions regarding the
terms "should" and "shall," as well as the terms "natural resources" and "Earth environ-
ment" discussed in note 25 supra. However, this will merely begin the process of legal deliber-
ations, rather than end it. See notes 163-70 infra and accompanying text.
32. See notes 51-67 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the right to conduct
remote sensing activities.
33. See notes 68-138 infra and accompanying text for discussion of national policies on
dissemination.
34. For a discussion on national policies, see Chile, notes 110-11 infra and accompanying
text; Australia, notes 124-28 infra and accompanying text; and Italy, notes 129-33 infra and
accompanying text.
35. Although a concern with potential abuses appears implicit in any discussion of re-
mote sensing, this concern was explicitly recognized by Robinson, For a Worldwide Utiliza-
tion and Dissemination of Data Acquired Through Remote Sensing, in LEGAL IMPLICA'rONS
oF REmorE SENSING FROM OUTER SPACE 113, 118 (N. Matte & H. DeSaussure eds. 1976).
[Vol. 2
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clarified areas where problems are most likely to be encountered.3 '. This Comment is premised upon the supposition that, to ensure
organized development, any nation-state ultimately desires benefi-
cial control of all information applicable to its territory. Part of this
desire is the perceived necessity for a state to retain dominion over
its jurisdictional boundaries, assets, and resources. Remote sensing
is sometimes viewed as a threat to this control. The analyzed data
may be used to appraise various forms of land usage such as urban
growth, industrialization, road development, and major engineering
projects, or the extent of agricultural and forestry ranges.37 The
information may also be utilized to predict crop yields; to regulate
water resources; to aid fisheries management; and to identify geo-
logic zones likely to contain valuable natural resources, notably
mineral and petroleum deposits.38 Furthermore, the information
may prove beneficial in relieving impacts of natural disasters.3'
Some nations are concerned that government or private enti-
ties, through superior technology, might enjoy enhanced negotiating
positions in bargaining for rights to resource development and ex-
ploitation.40 Such negotiating leverage, it is feared, may even be
detrimental to those nations originally possessing the resources."
This results in an anxiety among some states that they will be
unable to ensure receipt of adequate compensation for any economic
benefits derived from their resources.'2 Remote sensing may also
present a military-oriented danger. Ability to control and protect a
36. For further development of these areas, see discussion of national policies at notes
68.138 infra and accompanying text; right to conduct remote sensing activities at notes 51-
67 infra and accompanying text; and United Nations proposals at notes 24-30 supra and
accompanying text.
37. Morley, Remote Sensing Satellites-What Do They Actually Measure and How Sen-
sitive Is the Information, in LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF REMOTE SENSING FROM OrER SAPCE 13,
17 (N. Matte & H. DeSaussure eds. 1976).
38. Id. at 14-17.
39. Doyle, supra note 7, at 8-9.
40. Stowe, The Development of International Law Relating to Remote Sensing of the
Earth from Outer Space, 1976 PRoc. NINETEENTH CoLLOQuIuM L. OUrT SPACE 92, 96
[hereinafter cited as The Development of International Law].
41. Id.
42. Id. Other expressions on the perceived threat of remote sensing from space can be
found in Bordounov, Legal Problems of Use the Data Remote Sensing [sic], 1976 PRoc.
NINETEENTH COLLOQUIUM L. OUTER SPACE 240, 241; and Wang, Canada and the International
Principles Governing Remote Sensing, in LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF REMOTE SENSING FROM OuTER
SPACE 151, 155 (N. Matte & H. DeSaussure eds. 1976).
For further development of the economic impact of remote sensing, see statements by
the Argentinian and Swedish representatives before the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.226-245, at 67-69, 72-74 (1975).
1979]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Ann.
nation's jurisdictional boundaries may be severely handicapped if
remote sensing activities were to "reveal the defence capability of a
country and thus represent a threat to its national security." 3
Threats to economic and military control are interrelated. In an
attempt to remedy related problems any individual national policy
necessarily reflects a state's perception of the combined dangers.
One manner of ensuring desired control is through the establish-
ment of a legal framework. Initially, however, at least two major
obstacles hinder any comprehensive legal developments. First, the
scientific and technological advances which made remote sensing
possible may, by their continuing progression, drastically alter the
very nature of remote sensing. Second, no universally accepted or-
ganizational structure exists for collecting, analyzing and dissemi-
nating remote sensing products. Since legal aspects of remote sen-
sing may be inherently altered by the changing impacts of any of
the preceding, a controversy has arisen over the most appropriate
sequence of developing these respective areas.
4
IV. TIE ROLE OF LzGAL DLmERATIONS
Remote sensing programs will not be universally accepted until
all nations are assured that benefits will outweigh potential abuses.
This requires that each nation have the ability to deter others from
utilizing remote sensing in an abusive manner. 45 A viable framework
for governing remote sensing activities must incorporate technologi-
cal, organizational and legal considerations. Although United Na-
tions deliberations have focused upon these areas, their efforts have
43. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Scientific and Technical Sub-
Committee (196th mtg.) U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.1/SR.196, at 10 (1978) [herinafter cited as
U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.1/SR.196].
44. The ad hoc Uniied Nations Working Group on Remote Sensing of the Earth by
Satellite, one of the first United Nations bodies to consider the implications of remote sensing
from space, stated:
Some delegations, while not denying the importance of available satellite remote
sensed data, . . .expressed the view that the distribution of presently available
data should not in any way hinder the urgent elaboration of legal principles or
binding legal instruments to govern this activity. Some delegations did not believe
that such elaboration was a matter of any urgency.
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/125, at 12 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/125].
45. Although one of the primary functions of legal deliberations regarding remote sensing
may be to develop a definition of what constitutes an "abuse" of the technology, for the
purpose of this paper an abuse can be considered as any use of remote sensing which is
contrary to the interests of any nation. The problem facing legal scholars is to create appropri-
ate remedies for each abuse. See notes 160-67 infra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 2
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failed to provide an effective system for organized development."
The primary'reason has been their inability to maximize benefits
while minimizing potential detriments.'
7
In a purely abstract situation, the only function served by a
remote sensing system is to gather data. This data then produces
information of a type or to a degree which was previously unattaina-
ble. The benefit of such a system is that the acquired information
may then be applied to achieve previously unattainable results. The
detriment of such a system is that the results of application may be
used to aid one party at the expense of another. Remaining in an
abstract situation, the solution would be to either prevent the ac-
quisition of the information or to develop a remedy for inappropriate
uses. The former proposition, if instituted, might thwart any use of
the system, beneficial or otherwise, while the latter proposition
could be employed to selectively frustrate detrimental uses. None-
theless, it is the former proposition, that of restricting access to
remotely sensed information, which has been more widely pursued.
Not only does this unnecessarily limit the prospective value of re-
mote sensing systems, it is not within the legal field's expertise of
creating remedies for abuses."
Before legal energies can suitably be applied toward resolving
the conflicts created by remote sensing, several issues must clearly
and consciously be addressed. First, it must be decided whether the
benefits offered by remote sensing should be pursued. If so, then the
fields of science and technology, rather than the field of law, can
best apprise us of what the benefits are likely to be and what is the
best method for their acquisition.
Second, once the capabilities of remote sensing are established
by science and technology, it must be determined what detriments
may accompany these benefits. It would appear that individuals
involved in the military, economics, and business are best able to
decide what these detriments would be.' Again, this is not truly an
area of legal expertise.
The third issue to be addressed is whether a remedy is needed
46. See notes 163-70 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the legal inadequa-
cies of the United Nations proposals.
47. Id. See also discussion in note 31 supra and accompanying text.
48. Robinson, supra note 35, at 118, argues that the creation of remedies for abuses
should be the proper area for legally related efforts.
49. It has been suggested that these persons, possibly even moreso than legal scholars,
should become involved in the development of an acceptable scheme for the international
conduct of remote sensing activities. See generally The Development of International Law,
supra note 40, at 97.
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for any or all of the potential detriments. A decision as to the necess-
ity of establishing a remedy and the nature of that remedy is more
of a political question than a legal one. It is at the level of determin-
ing the nature of remedies that legalities should have their first
impact. Legal deliberations can clarify the types of remedies which
may be provided and the manner in which these remedies can be
expected to affect the overall balance of benefits and detriments.
Even then, there is an indirect impact because the choice between
remedies must still be made at a political level. Politically, it may
be decided that the best remedy is to prevent abuses by precluding
certain possible uses, i.e., limiting the types of information which
may be acquired. This type of limitation then relates back to the
fields of science and technology rather than to the field of law be-
cause the simplest and surest method of restricting information is
to prevent collection of the data upon which the information is
based.
If all of the above issues are resolved in favor of the develop-
ment of legal remedies, then legal deliberations must consider to
what type of a system these remedies could best be applied. It is the
type of legal remedies available and their most appropriate system
of application to which legal deliberations should be, and have not
been, energetically applied. This ultimately will bring the discus-
sion full circle, since in determining to what type of system legal
remedies can best be applied, there must be reference to the capaci-
ties of science and technology to develop such a system. However,
the existence of such a common beginning and end does not imply
that any sequence of resolving the issues may properly be followed.
Thus far, international legal concerns have centered around two
primary considerations: the right of nations to conduct remote sen-
sing activities and the right to disseminate the products of remote
sensing such as data and information. 50
'A. Right to Conduct Remote Sensing Activities
The 1967 Outer Space Treaty is the international document
generally accepted as having established the legality of conducting
remote sensing activities from space."' Article I provides in relevant
part that "[ojuter space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all States without
50. See notes 51-138 infra and accompanying text.
51. 1967 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 29.
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discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance
with international law .... ",52
The United States maintains that remote sensing comes within
the definition of peaceful uses of outer space and is thus sanctioned
by this article. 3 Other parties argue that this article applies.only to
"space-oriented" rather than "Earth-oriented" uses of outer space.5'
The lack of specificity in article I relating to remote sensing activi-
ties arguably supports either position. If the former position is ac-
cepted, then all nations have an equal right to conduct remote sen-
sing on a global basis. If the latter position is accepted, then the
realm of remote sensing must necessarily be governed by doctrines
other than the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty. The applicabil-
ity of principles of sovereignty is an alternative source of governance
which is often discussed. Historically, a nation's right to control its
resources was recognized by classical concepts of sovereignty."
Remote sensing, however, may affect this control by determining
who is aware of the status of a state's resources. Further, some
nations perceive this as a potential threat to their military as well
as economic well-being, while other nations do not feel similarly
52. 18 U.N.T. at 2412-13, T.I.A.S. No. 6347 at 3-4.
53. Statement by Ronald F. Stowe, supra note 15, at 420. This was reinforced more
recently in U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.1/SR.196, supra note 43, at 12.
54. See generally Vereschetin, Perspectives of the Uses of Outer Space For Applied
Purposes and State Sovereignty, 1976 PROC. NiNrrFvrM COLLOQUIUM L. OUTER SPACE 104.
The distinction between "space-oriented" and "Earth-oriented" uses of outer space is
dependent on the purposes to which satellite sensors are applied. If satellite sensors are
utilized for examination of extraterrestrial bodies and activities, it is then considered a
"space-oriented" use. If the same satellite is employed for examinations of the Earth, it is
then considered an "Earth-oriented" use.
It is significant to note that other Soviet authors have expressed the opinions that: (1) If
provisions of the Outer Space Treaty are respected, the actions collecting data do not consti-
tute an immediate threat to the legitimate interests of states, but that prohibiting remote
sensing of a foreign state's territory without that state's consent would contradict the gener-
ally recognized principle of freedom of outer space. Bordounov, supra note 42, at 241; and
(2) while space is open for research and use, including remote sensing of Earth resources, a
solution to the problem of remote sensing could be found in "separating the regime of
gathering information with the use of space technology from the regime of using the informa-
tion received." Zhukov, International Law Problems Related to the Exploration of Earth
Resources from Outer Space, 1976 PRoc. NINETEENTH COLLOQuIuM L. OUTER SPACE 108, 109.
This last proposal, of separating the gathering of information from the use of information,
has also been attributed to Dr. Franco Fiorio by Reijnen, Remote Sensing by Satellites and
Legality, in LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF REMOTE SENSING FROM OUTER SPACE 19, 22 (N. Matte &
H. DeSaussure eds. 1976).
55. These concepts have been reiterated under resolutions of the United Nations General
Assembly. See G.A. Res. 2158, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 29, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966);
G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962); G.A. Res. 1314,
13 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 18) 27, U.N. Doc. A/4090 (1958).
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threatened. 5 As a result, the extent to which the parameters of
sovereignty will be recognized when applied to remote sensing re-
main unsettled.
Assuming that a remote sensing system was designed to collect
data solely from areas within a sensing state's jurisdiction, other
nations would have no grounds for objection on the basis of sover-
eignty. Then, once the right to conduct any remote sensing is admit-
ted, there is a problem in determining the acceptable limits of sen-
sing foreign territories as necessary for maintenance of internal con-
trol. As noted," current technology does not permit selective data
collection by remote sensing. Nations such as the United States and
the Soviet Union can employ purely "internal" systems using pres-
ent technology. Both nations can position ground-based receiving
stations in the interior, rather than on the perimeters of their terri-
tories. 5 Then, by removing the onboard-satellite tape recorders,
they could prevent collection of data beyond ground-station receiv-
ing range. This would ensure that while they might not be able to
sense all their territory, the territory sensed would be solely their
own.
Unfortunately, using present technology the vast majority of
existing nations lack sufficient size to be able to collect data encom-
passing only their own territories. To gain this purely internal infor-
mation, geographically smaller states must also acquire data re-
garding adjoining territories.59 Currently, the only viable alternative
to this procurement of extraterritorial data would be for these
smaller states to forego the collection of remote sensing data until
further advances in science and technology permit selective collec-
tion. To thereby deny these smaller nations the opportunity to con-
duct remote sensing may affect their ability to control their own
resources and may be tantamount to denying them the ability to
exercise their sovereign rights.
56. See discussion on international consideration at notes 32-44 supra and accompanying
text; and discussion on national policies at notes 68-138 infra and accompanying text.
57. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
58. The Soviet system does not use ground receiving stations for acquisition of its remote
sensing data, but instead relies on recovering film which is ejected by the sensing satellite
and intercepted as it falls toward Earth. U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/216, supra note 4, at 12.
This might allow for regulation of data collection if the satellite sensors are turned on
and off. However, as long as the sensor remains in continual operation the Soviet system
acquires data regarding territory beyond its jurisdictional boundaries.
59. A related sovereignty problem arises when larger nations operate remote sensing data
reception stations near their borders. In an effort to acquire information regarding all, rather
than just part of their territory, these nations would necessarily obtain data pertaining to
foreign territories as well. Statement by Ronald F. Stowe, supra note 15, at 422.
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Furthermore, since conditions in neighboring territories may
directly affect the internal status of a state, 0 there is arguably a
sovereign right for each state to have and receive certain "foreign"
information. Therefore, one nation's sovereign right not to be sensed
without its consent must be balanced against another nation's sov-
ereign right to acquire data about its own territory. Once the right
to sense even small areas of foreign territory without that territory's
consent is accepted, the problem of limiting the parameters of the
examination continues."
The scope of this difficulty is expanded because, as a purely
practical matter, the potential benefits offered will discourage na-
tions already possessing remote sensing capabilities from relin-
quishing those capacities merely because other nations object to
their activities. 2 Even ignoring this last consideration for the mo-
ment, the fact remains that neither outer space treaty provisions nor
sovereignty arguments conclusively preclude remote sensing activi-
ties on an extraterritorial basis.
In many instances,6 remote sensing benefits can be dissipated
if data availability is limited along national boundaries. 4 If the goal
of the world community is to be maximization of the potential bene-
fits of remote sensing, then in these instances it "would not be
desirable to limit the coverage of the space segment to one individ-
ual state at a time, even if this were to be technically feasible."6 5
Accordingly, it would appear that the proper response of the world
community would be to recognize openly the acceptability of all
nations collecting remote sensing data. Fortunately, even though
60. E.g., where snowfall or rain runoff in one nation supplies significant water resources
to an adjoining nation, where fault lines cross national boundaries, and where crop disease
or pollution originates in one nation and threatens to spread to other nations.
61. Since internal conditions or resources anywhere in the world may have at least some
impact in every other nation, the argument can be expanded in order to give every nation a
vested interest in the status of every other nation.
62. These activities admittedly include a regular practice of worldwide overflights in
conducting global remote sensing programs such as might evolve into a status of customary
international law, even while the relevant debates continue.
63. E.g., studies of ecological, water and rift systems, vegetation and soil patterns, and
pollution. Statement by Ronald F. Stowe, supra note 15, at 422.
64. Id.
65. U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/125, supra note 44, at 13.
Another important consideration is that attempts to develop technology that allows
remote sensing data to be either gathered or disseminated selectively, in accordance with
national boundaries or similar restrictions, not only dissipates potential benefits, but also
increases the cost of obtaining these decreased benefits by increasing the cost of developing
and operating a remote sensing system.
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the subject continues to be a source of United Nations discussions,"
the issues surrounding data collection appear fairly well settled in
favor of this view.6
7
B. National Policies on Dissemination
The current controversy centers primarily around policies for
dissemination. The two areas of dissemination are information and
data. Definitions have been developed that distinguish between the
data received and transmitted by the space segment, and the resul-
tant product of processing and analysis by the ground segment. 68
Recognizing that any definitions would be relevant only to the pres-
ent state of technology,"1 the following definitions have been pro-
posed:
7 0
(1) The term 'primary data' means those data which are acquired
by satellite-born remote sensors and transmitted from a satellite
either by telemetry in the form of electromagnetic signals, or phys-
ically in any form such as photographic film or magnetic tape, as
well as the pre-processed products derived from those data which
may be used for later analysis;7
(2) The term 'analyzed information' means the end-product re-
sulting from the analytical process performed on the primary data
66. See generally U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.1/SR.196, supra note 43.
Some countries, such as Egypt, have recently reiterated the desire to require that remote
sensing activities be subject to the consent of the sensed state. However, since most nations
have already discarded this position, it can logically be expected to dissipate again, as all
countries become more familiar with the overall ramifications of remote sensing programs.
67. The Development of International Law, supra note 30, at 94.
68. Working Group I of the Legal Sub-Committee has arrived at the interpretation that
"(1) the term 'data' means the raw product emanating from a remote sensing satellite as well
as the pre-processed but non-analyzed products obtained from these raw products and (2)
the term 'information' means the results of analysis of the above-mentioned pre-processed
data, in whatever format." Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Annex III, U.N.
Doc. A/AC.105/171, at 4 (1976).
The Scientific and Technical Sub-Committee considered the above definition and sug-
gested that
[iJn order to minimize ambiguity it would be advisable to replace the term 'data'
with the term 'primary data', and replace the term 'information' with the term
'analysed information', which recognized that the analysed information arises out
of the process of analysis of primary data in combination with other inputs such as
previous knowledge and ground truth.
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, supra note 4, at 9.
69. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, supra note 4, at 9.
70. Id. These definitions were developed by the Scientific and Technical Sub-Committee
after it considered prior definitions. See note 68 supra and accompanying text.
71. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, supra note 4, at 9.
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combined with data and knowledge obtained from sources other
than remote sensing satellites."
Definite recommendations have been expressed for means of regu-
lating data and information dissemination. Soviet proposals,73 in
conjunction with the United States policy of open dissemination,"
are illustrative of the continuum along which dissemination argu-
ments have fallen.
1. Soviet Policy
An early Franco-Soviet proposal5 would not have restricted the
right of nations to conduct remote sensing activities; however, it
would have extended the principle of state sovereignty to encompass
the right of a nation to control the disposal of information regarding
its resources.
A more recent Soviet proposal'$ suggested "global," "regional,"
and "local" classifications of remotely sensed data." These pro-
posed categorizations would be based upon a combination of the
clarity of the transmitted image and the size of the area scanned per
image. 8 Once these classifications were established, the U.S.S.R.
maintained that both "global" and "regional" data could be openly
disseminated, while data within the definition of "local informa-
tion" should be disseminated only with the consent of the sensed
72. Id.
73. See notes 75-84 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the Soviet policy.
74. See notes 85-105 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the United States
policy.
75. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
76. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, supra note 4, at 10.
77. Id. Although the Soviet proposed categories, as set out in this document, are referred
to by the Scientific and Technical Sub-Committee Report as being "global information,"
"regional information" and "local information," surrounding language and the earlier defini-
tions of "data" and "information" suggest the term "information," as used, was misapplied
and should have been replaced by the term "data."
78. "Global" data would be those images covering the largest areas per frame and having
the lowest degree of object identifiability. "Local" data would encompass those images ob-
taining the highest degree of image clarity and covering small areas per image, while
"regional" data would consist of all data collected in sensing areas between the "global" and
"local" classifications.
As set out, "global information" would be data "with spatial resolution ranging from
several hundred metres to several kilometres to 2,000-3,000 kilometres." "Local information"
would be all data "with spatial resolution ranging from several metres to 30-50 metres, and
covering distances of less than 150-180 kilometres." "Regional information" would include
all data "with spatial resolution ranging from 50-100 to 300-500 metres, and covering dis-
tances ranging from 180-200 to 600-800 kilometres." Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space, supra note 4, at 10.
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state.79 This position was further developeds" to recommend that in
order to avoid "detrimental impact," data obtained at a resolution
finer than fifty meters, as well as any analyzed information on the
natural resources of any country, should not be disseminated with-
out the consent of the sensed state.8'
Consent prior to dissemination of information regarding natu-
ral resources was considered mandatory since the information could
impact economically on the sensed nation . 2 The Soviet policy also
advocated regulation of data dissemination because of potential
uses detrimental to the sensed state's defense capabilities. Accur-
ate data in the area of defense was felt to require thirty-meter (100-
foot) resolution;u therefore, a fifty-meter (160-foot) resolution limit
was chosen as the point at which consent of the sensed state should
be required.
2. United States Policy
The United States position favors free and open dissemination
of remote sensing data8s in direct opposition to restrictive dissemi-
nation proposals. When dealing with natural resources, this position
is premised upon the belief that data interpretation taking place on
the ground, rather than the mere collection of data, ultimately de-
79. Id.
80. U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.1/SR.196, supra note 43, at 9-10.
81. Id. at 10.
82. An example of such economic impact was stated to have resulted from a United
States prediction of Soviet crop yield for 1977, which then became available to cereal firms.
The statement implies that market conditions for Soviet grain sales were adversely affected
by this prediction. Although the Soviets further stated that this prediction later proved to
be erroneous, there was no clarification of whether it was merely the error in forecast, or the
forecast itself, which was objectionable. Id.
83. The Soviet example of detriments to defense capabilities, and therefore, to a state's
national security, was the possible disclosure of data on ports, railroads and shopping lanes.
d.
84. Id.
85. When the United States working paper was submitted to the Legal Sub-Committee
of COPUOS in 1975, see note 24 supro, part of a statement which accompanied that proposal
said, "[wle expect to have access to and to use data about the natural environment of this
Earth in any case. We believe that it is strongly in the interests of other states that we and
other collectors of this data share it rather than being in effect asked not to." Statement by
Ronald F. Stowe, supra note 15, at 421.
The United States still reflected this view in a 1978 statement before the COPUOS
Scientific and Technical Sub-Committee, when it was stated that the United States govern-
ment "would feel that a great disservice was being done to other countries if it was forced to
establish a regime restricting information collected by satellite. For its own part, it would
obtain the data and make them available to all." U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.1/SR.196, supra note
43, at 10.
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termines the types of information elicited. 8 Therefore, the argu-
ment continues, no data from remote sensing satellites can be re-
stricted as peculiar to natural resources- 7 Furthermore, the United
States maintains that technical parameters, such as spatial resolu-
tion, provide an unworkable basis for controlling data dissemina-
tion." Since spatial resolution or other technical parameters only
determine what kind of data is acquired, and not what uses are
ultimately proposed for that data, the United States opinion is that
data which has a valid, peaceful, scientific application should not
be suppressed simply because the data might also have military
applications.8
This attitude appears to conform with the goal of maximizing
the potential benefits derivable from remote sensing and seems to
indicate at least a superficial willingness to subrogate other consid-
erations to the achievement of this goal. However, despite this ap-
parent commitment to open disclosure, the United States policy
does not necessarily require that processed information be subject
to the same considerations of open disclosure as are given to raw
data. Article VII of a United States working paper, presented in
1975,90 states in relevant part that
States engaged in such remote sensing programmes shall within
their capabilities endeavor to assist on an equitable basis other
interested States, organizations and individuals to develop an un-
derstanding of the techniques, potential benefits and costs of re-
mote sensing. Such assistance could include the provisions of op-
portunities to learn what data are available, how to handle and
interpret the data, and, where appropriate, how to apply the
knowledge gained . . .
It seems certain from later pronouncements of United States
policy that the "opportunities to learn. . . how to handle and inter-
pret the data" are not intended to be synonymous with open diffu-
sion of the information derived from that data. The United States
has adopted the position that a new intellectual property exists after
data analysis is complete, which should be treated as if it were
patentable.2 It is further argued that this information is the exclu-
86. Statement by Ronald F. Stowe, supra note 15, at 420.
87. Id.
88. U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.1/SR.196, supra note 43, at 13.
89. Id. at 12.
90. U.S. working paper, supra note 24.
91. Id. at 2.
92. U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.I/SR.196, supra note 43, at 12.
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sive property of its producer, who ostensibly may use it in a manner
not violative of existing law. 3 Exemplifying this policy was a state-
ment by a United States representative that "[s]hould a law be
introduced, stipulating that intellectual property that could have an
impact on a Government. . . be subject to that Government's con-
trol, he did not believe that the United States could agree to its
being applicable to United States citizens."'" Although the ramifi-
cations of this statement are uncertain, it appears that the United
States will refuse to recognize international controls over this infor-
mation."
The United States government finds'support for its open dis-
semination policy in three basic areas. The LANDSAT program,
conducted under the auspices of the National Aeronautics and
Space Act," provided one of the fundamental bases of United States
policy. In part, the Act dictates that the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) must "provide for the widest prac-
ticable and appropriate dissemination of information concerning its
activities and the results thereof.' 7 These internal statutory re-
quirements are given an international impact, despite the somewhat
questionable relevancy of arguing for international laws based upon
purely domestic statutes, because foreign nations wishing to operate
LANDSAT ground receiving stations and obtain LANDSAT satel-
lite data transmissions must agree to accept and abide by the obli-
gations of the Act. 8 Further, the point has been made that notwith-
standing the promulgation of contrary international law, the United
States will continue to be bound by its own law internally. This
being true, the United States government and NASA will continue
to openly disseminate remotely sensed data to United States citi-
zens. International laws that prevent the United States government
from openly disseminating this data to foreign entities could easily
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. If this interpretation is correct, then the validity of this information existing as an
intellectual property is irrelevant. The reality of the situation is that the United States has
the information and intends to use it, with little regard for contrary world opinion.
96. National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2451-2484 (1976).
97. Id. § 2473(a)(3).
98. In order to obtain LANDSAT ground receiving stations, as well as access to the
necessary satellite communications, foreign nations must execute formal agreements with the
United States regarding the conduct of these stations. Part of this formal agreement includes
satisfaction of the terms of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958.
See, e.g., Remote Sensing From Satellites and Aircraft, Mar. 19-22, 1976, United
States-Canada, 27 U.S.T. 1075, T.I.A.S. No. 8247; Remote Sensing: Acquisition of Satellite
Data, Jan. 1-31, 1975, United States-Zaire, 26 U.S.T. 1699, T.I.A.S. No. 8129.
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be circumvented by foreign parties by retaining a United States
citizen to obtain the data."
The second basis from which the United States draws support
for an open dissemination policy is the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.L'
Article XI provides, in relevant part, that states conducting activi-
ties in outer space "agree to inform the Secretary-General of the
United Nations as well as the public and the international scientific
community, to the greatest extent feasible and practicable, of the
nature, conduct, locations and results of such activities."' ' This
language is, on its face, highly analogous to the language of the
United States National Aeronautics and Space Act.0 2 By relying on
this clause, the United States clearly intends the language of both
documents to be similarly interpreted. However, interpretations of
the phrase "to the greatest extent feasible and practicable,"', 3 could
differ drastically between internal and international contexts.
A third basis supporting open dissemination is the United
States premise that such a policy will facilitate effective manage-
ment and control of natural resources. 0' Admittedly, remote sensing
capabilities can contribute to a nation's capacity for developing
resources. Since nations with the technological ability to do so will
continue to conduct remote sensing activities, it is contended that
restrictions on data dissemination would merely deny access to the
data and result in the creation of an elite group consisting solely of
those countries which operate spacecraft. 05 The net effect would be
that only those countries which operate spacecraft would possess
remote sensing data. 06 Therefore, the United States argues that
perhaps the only effective means of eliminating comparative dis-
crimination is to assure all nations equal access to remotely sensed
data.' o7
99. Robinson, supra note 35, at 121-22.
100. 1967 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 29.
101. 18 U.S.T. at 2418, T.I.A.S. No. 6347 at 8.
102. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2451-2484 (1976).
103. 18 U.S.T. at 2418, T.I.A.S. No. 6347 at 8.
104. "[Ain open and widely utilized system of data dissemination will enhance, rather
than undermine, the ability of states to manage and control the natural resources within their
respective territories . Statement by Ronald F. Stowe, supra note 15, at 423.
105. Id. at 421.
106. Id.
107. The "surest and perhaps the only reliable way to protect states from being compara-
tively disadvantaged or discriminated against, is to insure that all states and all peoples have
as much opportunity to obtain that data as does anyone else." Id.
Another area in which the United States finds tangential support of its open data dissem-
nation policy concerns items of decreasing potential benefits, and technological/economic
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3. Additional Nations Supporting Restricted Dissemination
Other nations have generally adopted, as a preferred policy,
some variation of the United States and U.S.S.R. proposals.' 5 Two
positions, premised upon the belief that data potentially detrimen-
tal to a state's interests should not be divulged without that state's
consent, also maintain that classifications between "global,"
"regional," and "local" data, or between "primary data" and
"analyzed information" are not the most viable solutions for limit-
ing remote sensing activities.'09 Under the first position, that of
Chile, utility of data is primarily dependent upon its intended ap-
plication."0 Therefore, regulation must be based upon a policy that
distinguishes between those situations where data utilization would
require direct access to the sensed territory and applications which
would not require such access."'
The second position, which is held by Brazil, rejects current
regulatory proposals on the ground that they fail to ensure a sensed
nation priority access to, and control over, data concerning its own
territory."2 From this perspective, it is argued that rights and duties
of states regarding remote sensing activities must be defined before
an international structure to coordinate such activities can be devel-
oped."' Proponents of this position encourage adoption of a system
difficulties of operating remote sensing systems under restrictive policies. See also notes 18,
55-56 supra and accompanying text.
108. Although some proposals may be more extreme in their restrictions than the Soviet
position, see, e.g., Latin-American proposals note 24 supra, these generally begin with sugges-
tions to regulate the right to conduct remote sensing activities. For a discussion of considera-
tions once the right to conduct these activities has been accepted, see notes 51-67 supra and
accompanying text. The Soviet and United States proposals can roughly be equated to oppos-
ite ends of a spectrum.
109. U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.1/SR.196, supra note 43, at 2-3 (policy statements by Chile
and Brazil).
110. Chile comments that a mineral survey also requires a follow-up field survey, but
harvest estimates could be well performed using only remote sensing data. Id. at 2.
Chile further maintains (despite its disagreement with "global," "regional" and "local"
classifications) that spatial resolution is the root of the problem because it determines the
identifiability of objects which might cause harm if disseminated. Id. at 3.
111. Id.
112. Brazil maintains that "the proposed categorization of data would not provide a
sensed State with an effective guarantee of priority access to, and control over data relating
to its own territory." Id. at 11.
113. Brazil expressed a fear that "creation of institutional machinery ... could lead to
consolidation of the prevailing laissez-faire attitude . I..." Id.
Brazil has also felt that until rights and duties are defined the current ability of technol-
ogically superior countries to use and abuse remote sensing technology is unjustifiable. Com-
mittee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Report of the Scientific and Technical Sub-
Committee (192nd mtg.), U.N. Doc. AC.105/C.1/SR.192 (1978) [hereinafter cited as U.N.
Doc. A/AC.105/C.1/SR.192].
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whereby less advanced states will share in technological develop-
ments to ensure that remote sensing activities will not unduly bene-
fit advanced nations to the detriment of the developing countries."
A third position, advanced by the German Democratic Repub-
lic (GDR), reflects much of Soviet policy."' It differs, however, in
two respects. First, there is no objection to the free distribution of
any LANDSAT primary data."' Since the newest LANDSAT has a
forty-meter resolution capability,"' this position accepts a finer res-
olution than the original Soviet proposed fifty-meter limit,"' while
still protecting the thirty-meter resolution barrier deemed necessary
by Soviet policy for acquisition of accurate military data."' The
second distinguishing feature of the GDR policy would allow any
sensed state unrestricted access to any data or information relating
to its own territory.'12
4. Additional Nations Supporting Open Dissemination
Austria, Australia, Italy, and the United Kingdom are among
the nations which favor an open dissemination policy similar to that
114. "It was Brazil's belief that ... there must be an equitable transfer of technology
to less favored nations, so that scientific and technological development in outer space could
take place under a new international economic order." Id. at 6.
115. Although the GDR shares with the Latin American nations a desire to protect a
sensed state's sovereign interests against misuse of either remotely sensed data or information
by third parties, its similarity to Soviet policy includes acceptance of the proposed categoriza-
tions of "global," "regional" and "local" data for the purposes of regulation. See U.N. Doc.
A/AC.105/C.1/SR.196, supra note 43, at 9.
116. Id.
117. See note 9 supra.
118. See notes 83-84 supra and accompanying text.
119. Id.
120. U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.1/SR.196, supra note 43, at 9.
Both Canada and Romania also supported unrestricted access by a sensed state to
remotely sensed data gathered over its territory. Id. The inclusion of this proposal, in
draft principles, by the Legal Sub-Committee Working Group M indicates universal accept-
ance. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
At this time, however, there does not appear to be any express Canadian policy on either
the possibility of unrestricted access by a sensed state to remotely sensed information devel-
oped from such data, or on the acceptability of unrestricted access to such data by third
parties.
Among the foreign nations already operating LANDSAT ground receiving stations, Can-
ada would appear to prefer that some restrictions be applied to data dissemination. Erik
Wang points out that Canada has domestic legislation, e.g. the Canada Oil and Gas Land
Regulations, which prescribe methods for distribution of natural resource data gathered
through conventional practices, such as seismic and borehole testing, and aerial photography.
Therefore, he notes that it is reasonable to assume that Canada, and other nations having
such internal data dissemination regulations, would choose to have equivalent arrangements
made for the dissemination of remote sensing data. See generally Wang, supra note 42.
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of the United States. Austria maintains that optimal use of remote
sensing will result if the data is universally available.'' In this re-
spect it attaches significance to the organizational aspects of remote
sensing'" and favors development of a comprehensive remote sen-
sing system under the direction of the United Nations.'
Australia maintains that free access to remote sensing informa-
tion by all nations is essential to the fullest realization of potential
benefits.Iu Australia also supports a United Nations coordinating
role, as long as it does not include either regulation or control func-
tions which would inhibit any state's ability to accept or reject any
advice.' 3 Further, Australia has rejected spatial resolution as a
basis for limitations on data dissemination.' 6 Austrialian spokes-
men have noted that a resolution of several hundred meters is suf-
ficient in oceanography, while mineral resource and land resource
surveys require eighty-meter and twenty to twenty-five-meter
resolutions, respectively.'" Therefore, an optimal spatial resolution
for regulation could exist only after the intended use was ascer-
tained.' 3
The Italian argument that satellite data is economically benefi-
cial only after it has been duly processed and integrated with data
from other sources parallels the Australian position. ' Italy supports
the position that data acquires no significance until oriented for
specific applications. 30 In expanding upon the restrictive Chilean
argument, Italy proposes that satellite resource-sensing results are
fully exploitable only with the active participation of the sensed
country; therefore, any dissemination restrictions would minimize
potential benefits without protecting any vital interests of the
sensed nation.'2 ' Italy maintains that universal dissemination of
121. U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.1/SR.196, supra note 43, at 6.
122. Austria "continued to attach the greatest importance to the organizational aspects
of remote sensing activities. . . ." Id.
123. "Austria would favour the future establishment of a global operational remote-
sensing satellite system co-ordinated by the United Nations in the same manner as the Global
Atmospheric Research Program (GARP) set up by the World Meteorological Organization for
a global weather watch and research activity." Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 7.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. This necessity of determining intended use is similar to the Chilean policy. See
notes 110-11 supra and accompanying text. However, the Australian perception that an
unrestricted system will yield increased potential benefits has resulted in a position advocat-
ing open dissemination.
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information is necessary to promote peaceful cooperation among
nations. 32 Therefore, Italy cautions against the adoption of restric-
tions which might impair the future usefulness of remote sensing
technology.'3
Like Australia and the United States, the United Kingdom has
adopted the view that classification of primary data based upon
spatial resolution provides an unworkable basis for data regula-
tion.1u Furthermore, the United Kingdom is in accord with the posi-
tion that unrestricted dissemination of remotely sensed data is ben-
eficial to all nations. ' Since some matters demand free diffusion of
information, I' the United Kingdom noted that the data so acquired
might then be used for many different purposes.'37 For this reason,
the United Kingdom has pointed out that there would be great
difficulty in restricting information for some purposes, but not for
others.13
5. Significant Changes in National Policies
Of all nations expressing views on remote sensing, France has
adopted the most radical change in policy. 3' Most, if not all, of this
132. The Italian "[g]overnment's position was based on the general conviction that the
free flow of information was a fundamental pre-condition of peaceful co-operation and mutual
understanding among peoples." Id.
133. "The adoption of such restrictions not only would result in withholding from a
number of countries data which might be important for the successful implementation of
their development programmes but also might impair the usefulness of remote-sensing tech-
nology in general and prove an obstacle to its progress." Id.
This attitude closely reflects United States policy. Italy's operation of a LANDSAT
receiving station may have influenced its position; however, other nations operating
LANDSAT stations have not been similarly supportive of the United States policy. This is
especially true of Brazil. See notes 112-13 supra and accompanying text. This is possibly true
of Canada as well. See note 120 supra.
134. U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.1/SR.196, supra note 43, at 8.
135. The United Kingdom delegation to COPUOS "supported the view ... that the
interests of all nations would be best served by a system of unrestricted dissemination of
remotely sensed data." Id.
136. The occurrence of natural disasters was the particular example from the United
Kingdom of matters that demand unrestricted diffusion of remotely sensed information. U.N.
Doc. A/AC.105/C.1/SR.192, supra note 113, at 4.
137. Id.
138. Id. In the statement made by the United Kingdom's representative, the terms
"information" and "data" appear to be used as interchangeable equivalents. This ignores the
previous distinctions of the United Nations definitions, as well as the fact that the practical
considerations of requiring unrestricted dissemination of information regarding natural disas-
ters are different than the consequences surrounding unrestricted dissemination of all data
from which that information was developed.
139. France was an early proponent of restrictive policies in the joint Franco-Soviet
working paper presented to COPUOS in 1975. See note 24 supra.
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alteration can probably be attributed to France's decision to de-
velop its own remote sensing program." 0 Although the 1975 Franco-
Soviet position granted a sensed state the right to control all infor-
mation relating to that state,' by 1977 France had shifted to the
view that "only analyzed information drawn from data with spatial
resolution finer than 10 meters [should] be made subject to legal
regimes.""' The French now advocate "realistic" regulation of re-
mote sensing activities."43 France has adopted the view that the
necessity of on-the-spot field work prior to application of satellite
data will prevent any loss of sovereignty, as long as the field work
is under the control of the sensed state.' Further, France now main-
tains that national interests are best safeguarded through wide dis-
semination, so that everyone, instead of just a minority, would be
fully informed."5 Finally, under the new French policy the sensed
nation must have priority access to data regarding its own territory
before it may be disseminated to third parties.' 4 Interestingly, this
"realistic" mode of regulating remote sensing is closer to United
States policies than to the prior Franco-Soviet position. There is a
question as to whether France actually believes that this is the best
universal policy, or whether, having access to remotely sensed data,
it consequently intends to use it. 14
V. DEVELOPING POTENTAL REMOTE SENSING SYSTEMS
The initial issue, whether it is desirable to pursue the benefits
of remote sensing in the face of the risks presented, appears to have
been generally answered in the affirmative. 4 Scientific and techni-
140. U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.1/SR.196, supra note 43, at 4.
141. See note 24 supra.
142. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, supra note 4, at 11. Not only is
this a much finer resolution than the Soviet proposed limit of 50 meters, see note 84 supra
and accompanying text, it would also regulate all such analyzed information whether or not
related to natural resources. See note 24 supra.
143. U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.1/SR.196, supra note 43, at 5.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 4.
146. Id. at 5.
147. If France is merely announcing its intent to make unilateral use of its remotely
sensed information, then the French policy appears to be nearly identical to the United States
policies. See notes 85-107 supra and accompanying text.
148. See notes 51-67 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the right to conduct
remote sensing activities. From a purely practical standpoint, the fact that the United States
and the Soviet Union have decided to continue these activities for their own benefit would
appear to demand that other nations also make use of remote sensing technology in order to
avoid becoming comparatively disadvantaged.
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cal debates have been concerned with how to provide these benefits
through wide availability of data and information, assuming states
willingly cooperate in sharing their relative data, information and
techniques."' Rather than ascertaining where legal developments
would be most beneficial and then focusing on those areas to arrive
at viable solutions, legal deliberations have taken the circuitous
approach of first determining where legal remedies are not neces-
sary. This method has the single advantage of assisting to develop
areas of consensus. However, since the consensus is over areas where
remedies are not needed rather than over areas where remedies are
necessary, actual progress to a solution is slow, if not nonexistent.
Furthermore, the first step in each attempt to delineate areas where
international legal considerations are not required seems inevitably
to involve scientific and technical considerations. Proceeding by
this method leads to endless volleys between each area of expertise
and creates unnecessary confusion of the relevant issues. This is as
true of national policies as it is of United Nations efforts. From this
perspective, the various national policies and United Nations delib-
erations can be examined to determine why they have not prog-
ressed more rapidly toward a viable solution.
A. Difficulties with National Policies
Soviet policy seeks to avoid "detrimental impact" by placing
restrictions on the dissemination of information about natural re-
sources and data having finer than fifty-meter resolution.'50 Even
though it can reasonably be assumed that the Soviets hope to
prevent all detrimental impact by this method, these categoriza-
tions can only create a presumption of potential detrimental im-
pact. By preventing some legitimate uses and failing to deal with
the possibility of misuse of unrestricted data and information, this
proposal is simultaneously overbroad and underinclusive.
Furthermore, by being presented in this manner, the proposal
leads to the scientific and technical problems of attempting to de-
termine what type of "resolution" is best used' 5' and what its equiv-
alents would be under different methods of data acquisition.
5 2 It
also fails to provide any solutions to potential disagreements over
the measurement of resolution or to conflicts regarding what infor-
149. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/216, supra note 4, at 15.
150. See note 84 supra and accompanying text.
151. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/216, supra note 4, at 7.
152. Id.
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mation will be held to relate to natural resources. If, instead, the
proposal had attempted to define the term "detrimental impact"
and made some suggestion as to who should decide conflicts over its
application to specific instances, then each of the previous difficul-
ties could have been avoided. Also, since the proposal appears to
suggest a legal remedy in either form, this latter method of presenta-
tion would more easily lend itself to legal considerations and conclu-
sions.
A similar difficulty of application results from regulatory pro-
posals which would distinguish between those situations where
data/information utilization would require direct access to the
sensed territory and applications which would not require such
access.'15 Implementation of a system to regulate such data/
information would be difficult insofar as access to the data must
exist prior to decisions regarding application of data.'5 These cate-
gorizations could again lead to scientific and technical difficulties
in establishing reasonable distinctions. Further, no other remedy is
provided in instances where mere prevention of access to either the
data/information or the territory is not successful in preventing
harm.
In addition, these regulatory schemes hinder the development
of functional remedies by helping to hide possibly illegitimate uses
of remote sensing technology. This is implicitly recognized by the
expressed fear of unequal bargaining positions."'" If only one party
has access to information then how will other parties know whether
remote sensing was responsible for the acquisition of this
information? More directly, how would an uninformed party dis-
cover any misuse of the information so acquired? The only alterna-
tives would appear to be: (1) a presumption that all unequal bar-
gains which might have been based upon unilaterally held remote
sensing information were the result of misuses of that information;
or (2) open dissemination of the information so that these inequali-
ties are not as likely to exist.
If the first alternative is chosen, and the presumption is in-
voked, it would still appear necessary to appoint a deliberative body
to distinguish between circumstances of "good business dealing"
versus actual overreaching. In short, it would still be necessary to
153. See, e.g., Chilean policy at notes 110-11 supra and accompanying text.
154. See notes 124-38 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the Australian,
Italian and United Kingdom attitudes.
155. See notes 40-42 supra and accompanying text.
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determine when a remedy is appropriate and also what is the appro-
priate remedy. Even then, how would the accused party rebut the
presumption short of disclosing the information it actually had at
the time of the negotiation, and how could it be determined whether
it actually had additional information unless the processes by which
the information was acquired were also disclosed? The result is
either an irrebuttable presumption or a full disclosure system.
Open dissemination proposals, such as those made by the
United States,5 " arguably circumvent the additional problems cre-
ated by the restrictive suggestions. However, from a legal develop-
ment standpoint, even the open dissemination proposals appear
inconclusive. Assuming all of the United States arguments are ac-
cepted, including the status of analyzed information existing as
patentable material, 5 ' no provision has been made for determining
when existing laws have been violated by different uses of this infor-
mation. Neither an arbitrative body nor a deliberative process has
been suggested. This is equally true of other open dissemination
policies.' Further, it may even be debatable whether United States
policy is truly one of open dissemination. The inconsistency in
United States policy inheres in a concern for open dissemination of
data, without equal concern regarding open dissemination of infor-
mation resulting from this data.'59 The result of unfettered control
over the dissemination of information would be the ability to dis-
close the information when desired, without any requirement of
continued disclosure, and without any established remedy for inju-
ries caused thereby. Despite open dissemination of remotely sensed
data, nations without the technological capability and scientific
infrastructure to effectively utilize this data may be disadvantaged,
as surely as if they never had access to the data. 60 Evidently, official
United States policy fails to perceive or adequately deal with this
notion of comparative disadvantage.'
156. See notes 85-107 supra and accompanying text.
157. See notes 92-95 supra and accompanying text.
158. See notes 121-38 supra and accompanying text.
159. See notes 90-91 supra and accompanying text.
160. This was expressly recognized by the individual presenting the 1975 United States
working paper before the COPUOS Legal Sub-Committee. The Development of International
Law, supra note 40, at 96. See generally Wang, supra note 42.
As long as this comparative inequality among nations continues to exist it will be diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to quiet the aforementioned fear which some nations have that remote
sensing activities will result in unfair bargaining positions for exploitation and development
of natural resources. For these nations the cause of the discrepancy will be irrelevant. Their
concern will be solely with the impact of such a situation.
161. It is unlikely that this problem was not perceived in the development of the United
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Other proposals (which are arguably free dissemination poli-
cies), such as that which allows the use of computers to omit certain
regions at the data processing stage while disseminating that which
is retained,' are also insufficient for progressive legal deliberations.
The initial task of computer design is obviously a scientific and
technical consideration rather than a legal one. Such a suggestion
is also within the province of preventing potentially legitimate uses,
without supplying a remedy for potentially abusive applications of
the data or information.
B. Legal Inadequacies of United Nations Proposals
United Nations proposals, despite being specifically promul-
gated by the COPUOS Legal Subcommittee, are also guilty of inad-
equate legal development. The draft principles developed by the
Legal Sub-Committee Working Group 1H11163 are a specific example
of this inadequate legal development.
Although technical assistance is to be supplied "on mutually
agreed terms,"'64 sensing states are expressly reserved the right to
decide what technical information they are free to disclose. 5 No
provision has been made for determining proper conduct in the
absence of agreement. Again, a remediless situation results for par-
ties injured because of their inability to acquire the information.
While a sensed state would have access to information pertain-
ing to its territory,' the proposed principles state only that such
access would be "timely and nondiscriminatory," on "reasonable
terms," and "to the extent feasible and practicable."'6 7 There is no
provision for definition of these terms or for appropriate sanctions
in the event that a violation occurs. Similarly, there is no provision
for access by parties other than the sensed state. Furthermore, the
States policy. See note 160 supra. It is possible that the United States has recognized that it
has a vested interest in being able to exploit remote sensing technology to facilitate its
acquisition of interests in worldwide natural resources. The United States may be attempting
to solidify its position through development of analytical techniques, the results of which are
not to be generally shared with other nations, while simultaneously attempting to assuage
world opinion by offering to nations a torrent of remote sensing data which many nations
would be incapable of interpreting. A genuine commitment by the United States to develop
a substantial training program in interpretive technology for less developed nations would be
strong evidence that this possible shell game is not reflective of true United States policy.
162. This was proposed by Belgium. U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.1/SR.196, supra note 43, at
4.
163. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
164. Annex M, supra note 25, draft principle V.
165. Id. draft principle IX.




extent to which information "pertains" to a sensed state is unde-
fined.16
Language requiring that uses of remote sensing be consistent
with the legitimate rights and interests of other states is equally
ambiguous."' The draft principles fail to define "legitimate rights
and interests," or provide a basis for their future determination.
Therefore, it would be difficult under these principles to determine
when a transgression of these rights and interests has occurred.
Even when a violation unquestionably occurs, these proposed prin-
ciples do not establish a functional agreement regarding interna-
tional responsibility. The requirement that nations accept responsi-
bility for activities carried out by government entities would create
a limited legal obligation; 70 however, liability may be technically
avoided under this language if the sensing government places its
results at the disposal of "private" entities and thereafter disclaims
all responsibility.
C. A Proposal for Remote Sensing Solutions
The common factor of both national policies and United Na-
tions legal discussions to date is a failure to distinguish the specific
areas of potential detriment in a manner which lends itself to the
establishment of any truly progressive legal development. Policies
and proposals are couched in language which purports to offer solu-
tions, yet is often so undefined and susceptible to interpretation as
to be ephemeral in actual application. One possible explanation for
this situation is that these discussions are meant merely to appease
the concerned, rather than to develop actual solutions.
Assuming efforts in the area of remote sensing are sincere, most
of the initial scientific and technical considerations which must
precede legal deliberations have already been accomplished. The
capabilities of remote sensing technology are reasonably well
known, as are many of the potentially derivable benefits, 7 ' and the
possible resulting detriments.' What remains to be developed is a
viable method for assessing and applying legal remedies, and a func-
tional remote sensing system under which this legal regime can
operate responsibly.
168. Id.
169. Id. draft principle VIII.
170. Id. draft principle X.
171. See notes 37-39 supra and accompanying text.
172. See notes 40-43 supra and accompanying text.
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A highly developed technological and organizational regime of-
fers optimal potential benefits by making available the greatest
amount of data and information.'73 Access to such information
would promote efficient allocation of global resources, since parties
interested in acquiring specific resources would be able to effectively
locate such resources and negotiate accordingly for their acquisition.
Furthermore, open dissemination of information would prevent any
nation from gaining undue advantage in this bargaining process as
a result of unilaterally held knowledge.
To promote optimum potential, open dissemination of both
data and analysis techniques is required. Open dissemination of
data avoids technical and economic difficulties inherent in attempt-
ing to regulate its diffusion and lessens the potential for compara-
tive inequalities between nations. Open dissemination of analysis
techniques allows nations to develop information, without requiring
that any nation relinquish its own analyzed information.'74 How-
ever, even if data and analysis techniques are openly disseminated,
this alone will provide inadequate protection to nations unable to
finance their own programs. Therefore, a functional solution might
be to allow all nations to operate their own data analysis programs,
while simultaneously creating a separate system of disseminating
this same or similar information under the auspices of the United
Nations.
If such a program were implemented as supplemental to open
dissemination policies, technologically sophisticated nations could
retain exclusive control over their analyzed information, while the
interests of less sophisticated nations could be at least partially
protected through open dissemination of information analyzed by
United Nations sources. One purpose of this United Nations func-
tion would be to prevent the exacerbation of inequalities between
nations. From a legal development perspective, however, the United
Nations function would be to aid the application of legal remedies
to specific situations by creating an opportunity to determine when
173. Such a system would permit the collection of the largest quantities of data, and this
increased data should in turn promote reliable assessment of analyzed information. There-
after, increased access to the resulting information would allow for a broader range of informa-
tion application, which should ultimately increase the number and degree of potential bene-
fits to be made available.
174. Although it might be more desirable to offer open access to, and exchange of, the
information itself, practical considerations effectively prevent this from being a viable alter-
native in the near future. See notes 92-95 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of
the United States policy.
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abuses of remote sensing technology have occurred.'75
Optimal collection of data from which to develop this informa-
tion could be provided by a highly developed global system consist-
ing of several satellites and regional ground reception facilities. 7 ,
However, the primary purpose of a United Nations remote sensing
program could be satisfied by operation of a single satellite contain-
ing onboard recorders working in conjunction with a solitary United
Nations ground facility. 7' Although current opinion is against the
establishment of a United Nations owned and operated remote sen-
sing satellite system, 8 it appears desirable to create one in order to
guarantee that as far as possible, all nations have access to unbiased
information.' 7 ' Thereafter, it will still remain the task of legal delib-
erations to establish a process for determining abuses, fashioning an
appropriate remedy, and enforcing the agreed upon sanction. Since
175. This would permit an alternative to the possibly irrebuttable presumption of abuse
discussed at text following note 155 supra. Such a fact-finding purpose could be greatly aided
by the additional assistance of nationally operated remote sensing programs. However, where
the intent is to discover abuses as a means of assessing liability, an impartial third party with
certain minimal abilities to derive unbiased information would appear both desirable and
necessary.
176. It has been estimated by the COPUOS Scientific and Technical Sub-Committee
that 14 ground receiving stations in optimal locations could provide near complete coverage
of the Earth's land surface. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Report of the
Scientific and Technical Sub-Committee, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/150, at 8 (1975).
Since each remote sensing satellite can scan virtually any point on Earth, the number
of satellites needed for optimal coverage is largely dependent upon how often it is desirable
to gather data regarding any single area. See notes 6-11 supra and accompanying text.
Economically, the advantages of each additional satellite or ground station would dimin-
ish rapidly after the minimum numbers are established. The United States LANDSAT sys-
tem already has a sufficient number of ground stations, either already operating or proposed,
although not in an optimal coverage pattern. Altering some proposed locations, combined
with a program to make all current remote sensing systems compatible, would probably result
in a global system becoming a fait accompli.
177. Since the primary purpose of a United Nations system would be as a check for
possible abuses if an appropriate system of enforceable sanctions could be developed, then a
slight delay in receipt of relevant data would not defeat the purpose of the system. If, instead,
the purpose of the system was to act as a prophylactic against abuses, by making each nation
aware of the information as soon as any other party, and then leaving them to protect
themselves, time would be of the essence and nothing short of a highly developed global
system with open dissemination of both data and information would be acceptable. By
creating separate systems, competing national systems could provide this prophylactic effect
to some extent, while a United Nations program could serve a complementary role as part of
a remedial device.
178. U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/216, supra note 4, at 16.
179. Although the United States, in particular, claims that all LANDSAT data is openly
disseminated, it might be possible for a sensing state to screen the data it makes available
to others, even to the extent of providing for selective transmissions of data from its satellite,
to foreign nations' ground stations. Undue reliance on such a potentially disruptive arrange-
ment could defeat the ability to discover abuses of remote sensing technology.
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enforcement of sanctions may be particularly difficult in an interna-
tional context, the United Nations function may be limited solely
determining that an abuse of remote sensing technology has oc-
curred and making recommendation of an appropriate remedy, with
actual enforcement left to other methods. To this end, an agreement
automatically conceding the jurisdiction of the International Court
of Justice in all instances involving the possible abuse of remote
sensing might be sufficient.
CONCLUSION
United Nations involvement in the development of remotely
sensed information is necessary to ensure impartial reporting, by
protecting against the possible abuses of screening or selective
transmission of data.180 In order to establish liability for such
abuses, provision should be made for a remote sensing satellite and
ground reception facility owned and operated by the United Na-
tions.' s Legal expertise should focus upon preventing, or compen-
180. If the present competition for finite amounts of natural resources continues, the
pressure upon even the best intentioned of societies may cause it to attempt to manipulate a
remote sensing process to its own advantage and to the consequent disadvantage of other
nations. To expect it to then inform other nations of the possible abuse which it may have
committed would be unrealistic in the extreme.
181. The cost of establishing a United Nations system consisting of a single remote
sensing satellite and a single ground receiving station is not excessive, especially in light of
the potential benefits to be derived. The French SPOT system has an estimated cost of $160
million, which appears to include the expenses of establishing a launch capacity. It is not
evident whether this cost also includes the expenses of developing and maintaining a ground
receiving station and interpretive capacity. Ropelewski, French Pursue Own Space Program,
Av. WszK & SPACE TECH., June 12, 1978, at 21.
Reports on the costs of LANDSAT ground stations indicate that an additional $7 million
would be sufficient for such development costs and that ongoing operations costs would be
approximately $2 million annually. Satellite Launched to Eye Earth Resources, supra note
6, at 2, col. 5.
This would result in a total development cost of approximately $170 million, or less if
the launch capacity is included in SPOT's estimated costs and is not deemed necessary for
the propagation of the proposed United Nations system.
Assuming that the $170 million estimate is appropriate, financing. could be arranged
which would be relatively low cost, even with a prime interest rate of 101/2 percent, resulting
in monthly payments of $1,555,057. Since the original LANDSAT satellite operated for ap-
proximately five years, and was shut down rather than ceasing to function, it is reasonable
to assume future satellites will function as long or longer. Then, assuming a need to regularly
replace the satellite at 5 or 10 year intervals, there would be a need to refinance the recurring
costs.
By prorating the original loan over a 30 year period, but making the balance due upon
either a 5 or 10 year interval, the monthly payments remain constant. The only change is in
the amount of principal already paid at the end of each term. The outstanding amounts of
the loan can then be refinanced, along with the added costs of a new statellite, over another
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sating for, abuses which may occur. Initial regulatory guidelines,
although possibly necessary, should be kept to a minimum. The
emphasis should be upon creating an enforceable method of deter-
mining damages or other appropriate remedies. Extensive promul-
gation of regulations would not be desirable because case by case
determination of injury and damages permits a more flexible re-
sponse. Furthermore, regardless of whether regulations or case law
become the basis of the applicable regime, a judicial-type determi-
nation will be necessary to determine both the existence and sever-
ity of alleged violations.
A universally acceptable remote sensing program must quickly
be developed in light of the nationalistic and global concerns and
the continuing potential for remediless abuses of remote sensing
capabilities. Such a system is being unnecessarily postponed by
United Nations efforts to develop a solitary program which will
simultaneously encompass all scientific, technical, organizational
30 year period. This process can be repeated indefinitely, in much the same manner as a
national debt, except that if demand for this sensing service increases, the actual debt owed
can be regularly decreased and eventually paid in full.
Beginning with the stated payments of $1,555,057 per month, and including annual
operating costs of $2 million, the total monthly cost would be $1,721,723. The individual
payments could then be apportioned over the number of initially subscribing nations to
establish a basic service rate. For example, if there are only 10 nations initially subscribing,
then each nation would pay one-tenth of $1,721,723, or $172,172; if 20 nations initially sub-
scribe the monthly use fee would be reduced to $86,086. This basic service rate could then be
charged to all future subscribers, along with a one-time "initiation" fee, or, as the number of
subscribers increases, the monthly service rate for all members could be reduced. If the initial
base rate is levied upon each additional subscriber, then an increase in the number of partici-
pants will increase the total income without an increase in the monthly total due toward loan
repayment. These increased revenues, along with any "initiation" fees assessed, could then
be applied toward the outstanding balance of the loan, thereby reducing the principal due at
the end of each 5 or 10 year refinancing period. Continuing the assessments could eventually
create a positive reserve from which to finance future operations.
The combined factor of lowered initial/basic rates resulting from a greater number of
original subscribers, and the ability to charge higher "initiation" fees to later subscribers,
would, hopefully, influence a large number of nations into participating in such a United
Nations program. Furthermore, the benefits of having access to remotely sensed information
from the United Nations source should act to increase the overall prosperity of member-
subscribers, so that each nation is more easily able to afford the costs of this service.
This effort could be further aided, within the overall purpose of this proposed system,
by an agreement among member-subscribers that, whenever the system was used to establish
an abuse of remote sensing technology, which resulted in a finding of liability and eventual
recovery in favor of a member-subscriber, some agreed percentage of this recovery would be
due as a part of the individual subscriber's use-fee.
This type of financing arrangement, or any generally acceptable variation of the com-
bined proposals herein, could be used to counter the all too common result of valuable
international programs being defeated for lack of funding.
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and legal considerations. To prevent further misdirection of United
Nations efforts, the dichotomy between these areas should be recog-
nized so that human resources and energies can be more effectively
allocated to resolve the current dilemma.
Steven Parminter
